Where We Are & How We Got Here # 13 of 14

John Weaver | SermonAudio

Lecture MetadataDetails
SpeakerJohn Weaver
SourceSermonAudio
Media ID3290484233
SubjectNew Testament Studies
CourseRomans-Related Topical Applications
GenreSermon
Date1998-09-27
Dictation Name
BookBook 119: Where We Are & How We Got Here — Chapter 13
Source Timed Segments85

Synopsis: John Weaver examines why the South lost the War of Northern Aggression, arguing that purely human explanations (numerical, industrial, and economic disadvantages) are incomplete. He previews a theological answer to be given in the next sermon, emphasizing God's sovereignty over history.


Formatted Transcript

Introduction and Psalm 44

Weaver introduces the topic and reads Psalm 44, highlighting that God's people can be defeated even when not in open rebellion, as a framework for understanding the South's loss.

I've preached the series on "Where We Are and How We Got Here," the twelfth part, beginning in the 1830s, and showing that the situation we're in today basically began during Abraham Lincoln's reign and the tyranny that began there. So today I want to begin a two-part series, literally, on why the South lost the war. Now, let me just go ahead and tell you in advance that what I'm going to call the most important part will be next week, because there's just too much material to cover in one session. So I will give you the outline and you can understand why I say the most important part will be next week. Look in Psalm 44, and let's begin reading Psalm 44, verse 1. The psalmist said,

Scripture Reading — Psalm 44:1-26
"We have heard with our ears, O God, our fathers have told us what work thou didst in their days and times of old. How thou didst drive out the heathen with thine hand, and plantedst them; how thou didst afflict the people, and cast them out. For they got not the land in possession by their own sword, neither did their own arm save them, but thy right hand, and thine arm, and the light of thy countenance, because thou hadst a favour unto them. Thou art my King, O God: command deliverances for Jacob." "Through thee will we push down our enemies: through thy name will we tread them under that rise up against us. For I will not trust in my bow, neither shall my sword save me. But thou hast saved us from our enemies, and hast put them to shame that hated us. In God we boast all the day long, and praise thy name for ever. Now watch, but thou hast cast off, and put us to shame, and goest not forth with our armies. Thou makest us to turn back from the enemy, and they which hate us spoil for themselves." "Thou hast given us like sheep appointed for meat, and hast scattered us among the heathen. Thou sellest thy people for nought, and dost not increase thy wealth by their price. Thou makest us a reproach to our neighbours, a scorn and derision to them that are round about us. Thou makest us a byword among the heathen, a shaking of the head among the people. My confusion is continually before me, and the shame of my face hath covered me." "For the voice of him that reproacheth and blasphemeth; by reason of the enemy and avenger. All this is come upon us; yet have we not forgotten thee, neither have we dealt falsely in thy covenant. Our heart is not turned back, neither have our steps declined from thy way; though thou hast sore broken us in the place of dragons, and covered us with the shadow of death. If we have forgotten the name of our God, or stretched out our hands to a strange god; shall not God search this out? for he knoweth the secrets of the heart. Yea, for thy sake are we killed all the day long; we are counted as sheep for the slaughter." "Awake, why sleepest thou, O Lord? arise, cast us not off for ever. Wherefore hidest thou thy face, and forgettest our affliction and our oppression? For our soul is bowed down to the dust: our belly cleaveth unto the earth. Arise for our help, and redeem us for thy mercies' sake."

The Question of Why the South Lost

Weaver poses the question and notes that many 'what if' scenarios exist, but the real question is how the South held out so long given its disadvantages.

Now, in light of this passage, let's ask the question, why did the South lose the War of Northern Aggression? Or, why did the South lose the Second War for Independence? This is a question that has been asked by millions, debated by historians, and fallen over by military strategists. And let me just tell you up front, there are a lot of "ifs" when you consider this question. For instance, if General Beauregard had listened to Stonewall Jackson at First Manassas or Bull Run—and by the way, the reason so many of these battles have two names is because the Yankees gave it one name and the Southerners gave it another name, OK? So if Beauregard had listened to Stonewall Jackson at First Manassas or First Bull Run, July the 21st, 1861, the war would have been over at the first battle and the South would have won.

You see, Lincoln had only called for 75,000 volunteers for a period of three months. To him, you know, it's not going to be very difficult to whip the South. And so at First Manassas or First Bull Run, when the Federal troops came there to meet the Southern troops, to show you how arrogant and cocky and proud the Northerners were, women and children, congressmen, politicians, bureaucrats, all came out in their carriages with their picnic lunches and they were going to sit on the ground and have their picnic and watch the Federal troops devastate the Southern troops. The only problem is, it didn't work out like that. And the Southerners defeated the Northerners. And there was such a rout, I mean there was such a rout that the Federal troops left their cannon, dropped their rifles, and turned around and ran back to Washington, D.C. And in doing so, they turned over carriages of the civilians, carriages of men and women and children. They knocked them all aside and were getting back to Washington, D.C.

It was a thorough and a total rout. And Stonewall Jackson said, "Now is the time to march into Washington and finish it off. They have no reserves, they have no fortification, now is the time to finish it off." And General Beauregard said, "But our troops are green and untrained." And Jackson responded, "So are theirs." But still he was overruled. And had Stonewall's advice been taken, that would have ended it all right there. If General Braxton Bragg and several other generals had listened to Nathan Bedford Forrest, the war would have been won many times over. But let me tell you something. All hindsight is 20-20. All hindsight is 20-20.

Now, there is another way that you can ask the question, why did the South lose the war? And here's the way you really ought to ask this question. How did the South hold out for so long? Or how was the South able to fight for four long years? Because when I get through this morning, I think you're going to see it's only by an absolute miracle that the South was able to last four long years under such adverse circumstances. Now, when you ask the question, why did the South lose the war?

Limitations of Human Explanations

Historians give answers based on their disciplines, but leaving out the theological answer misses the majority of the explanation.

Well, historians give different answers, and I want you to note something. It doesn't matter which book that you read, I want you to understand that the answer that is given in each book is dependent upon the author's perspective, his discipline, and his area of expertise. For instance, an economist is always going to give you an economical reason as to why the South lost the war. And a politician is always going to give you a political reason. Now, I understand that there are economic reasons. I'm going to mention some of those. There are other reasons as well. But I believe that these are just simply only parts of the whole, and you really don't see the entire whole until you get to the part of the message I'm going to be dealing with next week, which of course is the theological answer. Now, I want you to understand that each answer may have some validity, and each answer may be part of the human equation, but each part does not make the whole. The parts may make up the whole, but when you leave out the theological answer, I believe you've left out the majority of the answer as well.

You see, we've got to remember that providence is the handmaiden of sovereignty. May I remind you that nothing comes to pass in time in history except that which God has ordained in eternity past. So when some of you think, "Well, history is kind of dull and bland," you better think again. I remember when I was a young boy, I could not figure out for the life of me why I had to memorize dates.

Numerical or Manpower Advantage of the North

The North had a 4-to-1 or 5-to-1 manpower advantage, used a smaller percentage of its population, and the South suffered disproportionate casualties.

Now, according to the census, according to the census, in the North there were 22 million people. In the South, you only had nine and a half million. Just at those odds, the North has a better than two to one advantage. But you've got to remember that the Southern armies did not regularly use the blacks in military service. And there were three and a half million blacks in the South. So now it's 22 million to 6 million, which is nearly a 4 to 1 numerical advantage. Moreover, you've got to understand that Northern agents were able to travel over Europe, and they did exactly what George III of England did during the Revolutionary War. They imported mercenaries to fight against the South, and the Northern agents were able to hire another 300,000 to 500,000 mercenaries to fight against the South.

So, you put all these figures together. And the North could call on four to five as many men of military age than the South could. So for every one man the South could call on, the North could call on either four or five. Let me put it to you another way. The North used about 44% of its manpower during the war. The South used 75% of its manpower. Now, out of all the battles that were fought during that war, very seldom, if ever, did the North find itself outnumbered. Usually, it was the Southern soldiers that were outnumbered. Many times, they fought three to four to five odds.

So it's absolutely amazing that they won the battle. Let me give you just an example. At the Battle of Chancellorsville where Stonewall Jackson was wounded, do you know that during that battle, 45,000 Confederates met and defeated 125,000 lavishly equipped Federal troops? Now you just stop and think about those odds. 125,000 against 45,000? And even at that particular time, Robert E. Lee had left some men—he left, I think it was 7,000 men to face 35,000 Federal troops. Then he took some of his men and went to meet Hooker as he came around the back way. And then Stonewall still took some of those men and outflanked Hooker and came around his rear. So Lee then divided his 45,000 men into three different forces at that particular time.

And each one of those bodies were grossly outnumbered. So, the North very clearly had a numerical advantage. Now, let me give you a statistic that was quoted by Ludwell Johnson in his book, North vs. South. He shows a lot of the advantages, and here's what he says. These statistics show that the South poured a far larger percentage of its human resources into the crucible of battle, and therefore suffered heavier proportional losses.

Now listen, based on incomplete Confederate records, it appears that there were about 100,000 battle-caused deaths, 200,000 deaths from disease, and 230,000 surviving wounded, or a total of 530,000 dead and wounded in the Confederacy, or 62% of those who served.

Now, these figures are on a scale compared to the old world where men were literally killed by the thousands, and these numbers are literally unparalleled in history. We did not lose this many in Korea. We did not lose this many in World War I and World War II. We did not lose this many in Vietnam. So, just in the South, there were 530,000 dead or wounded, 62%. On the other hand, the North, the Union dead came to 360,000, wounded 275,000, or a total of 635,000, and although there were more Northerners killed or wounded, yet they suffered only a 31% ratio, while the South suffered a 62%.

So very clearly, then, there was a numerical advantage.

Humanly speaking, numerically speaking, when you have four or five to one, it's only a matter of time until you're overrun. It's just that simple. I don't care how many you kill, very soon you're going to suffer to the extent that you're unable to function and unable to fight. And that's basically one of the reasons why the South lost, because of the numerical advantage.

Industrial Advantage of the North

The North's manufacturing output was ten times that of the South, and the South lacked factories, machinery, and raw materials to produce weapons and supplies.

Secondly, let me give you the second advantage today, and that is the industrial advantage. Now, everyone in this room knows that the South was an agricultural economy, and it still is, basically. The North was an industrial economy, and most of your manufacturers were in the North, and the South, therefore, was ill-prepared for a war. There were no factories in the South, basically, to produce more machinery. Let me give you another quote out of Johnson's book, North vs. South. Here's what he says on page 88. He says, "The North's huge preponderance of material resources was even more overwhelming than its numerical superiority."

Now listen, "Its manufacturing output in 1860 was ten times that of the South, and the difference in quality and versatility was almost as striking." So, although there were a few manufacturers in the South, they did not have the quality or the versatility of those manufacturers in the North. He says, "Northern iron foundries, shipyards, and machine shops could produce far better tools and weapons, such as superior military artillery and ammunition, turreted ironclad warships with efficient engines, and repeating rifles using metallic cartridges. The North had two and a half times the railroad mileage of the South and was able to lay track and build rolling stock if the war continued." Now, listen, "Southern railroads steadily deteriorated, almost no railroad iron was rolled, and not a single car or locomotive was manufactured. Accessible supplies of the necessary raw materials such as coal, iron ore, and copper were plentiful in the North, scarce in the South."

Now, we should stop and think about that. During the war, the South never built one locomotive, not one engine, not one train. Nor were they able to keep producing railroad iron to keep repairing the tracks that were constantly torn up. Now, I want to just share with you the real numerical advantage—not the numerical, but the industrial advantage. Now I want you to remember that Jeff Davis, who was president of the Confederacy, was accused by the Northerners of using his position in the Senate and on several committees of preparing the South to fight a war and to start a war. And when I read this, I'm going to show you how utterly false that charge was. I'm going to read from Jeff Davis' two-volume set, The Rise and Fall of the Confederacy, and here he is giving the weaponry that was available at the beginning of the war.

Now, listen carefully to what he says. "At the beginning of the war, the arms within the limits of the Confederacy were distributed as follows." Now, here is where they were located and how many. "At Richmond, about 4,000 rifles. Fayetteville, North Carolina, 2,000 rifles, 25,000 muskets. Charleston, South Carolina, 2,000 rifles, 20,000 muskets. Augusta, Georgia, 3,000 rifles, 28,000 muskets. Mount Vernon, Alabama, 2,000 rifles and 20,000 muskets. Baton Rouge, Louisiana, 2,000 rifles, 27,000 muskets, or a total of 135,000 weapons."

Now wait, he goes on. "There were at Richmond about 60,000 old flint muskets, and at Baton Rouge about 10,000 old Hall rifles and carbines. At Little Rock, Arkansas, there were a few thousand stands and a few at the Texas Arsenal, increasing the aggregate of serviceable arms to about 143,000. After these, the arms owned by the federal states and the military organizations would make a total of 150,000 for the use of the armies of the Confederacy." Let me just stop there. Do you remember how many I told you were killed and wounded in the Confederacy? About 530,000? And what is he saying at the beginning of the war? Enough to arm 150,000 soldiers. That's not all. Listen, he goes on saying, "The rifles were of the caliber .54, known as the Mississippi rifles, except those at Richmond taken from Harper's Ferry, which were of the new model, caliber .58. The muskets were of the old flintlock, Revolutionary War musket, caliber .69, altered to percussion."

"There were a few boxes of sabers in each arsenal and some short artillery swords. A few hundred holster pistols were scattered about. There were no revolvers. There was, before the war, little powder or ammunition of any kind stored in southern states, and this was a relic of the war with Mexico. It is doubtful if there were a million of rounds of small-arms cartridges. The chief store of powder was that captured at Norfolk. There was beside a small quantity at each southern arsenal in all 50,000 pounds chiefly old cannon powder. The percussion caps did not exceed one quarter of a million, and there was no lead on hand. There were no batteries or serviceable field artillery at the arsenals, but a few old iron guns mounted on Gribeauval carriages fabricated about 1812." Now we're talking 1860. So these old guns are nearly 50 years old. "The states and the volunteer companies did, however, possess some serviceable batteries."

"There were neither harness, saddles, bridles, blankets, nor other artillery or cavalry equipment. To furnish 150,000 men on both sides of the Mississippi in May of 1861, listen, there were no infantry accoutrements, no cavalry arms or equipment, no artillery, and above all, no ammunition. Nothing save arms, and these almost wholly the old pattern smooth-bore muskets altered to percussion from flintlocks. Within the limits of the Confederate states, the arsenals had been used only as depots, and no one of them, except that at Fayetteville, North Carolina, had a single machine above the grade of a foot lathe."

So no machinery to make weaponry. He said, "Except at Harper's Ferry Armory, all the work of preparation of material had been carried on at the North. Not an arm, not a gun, not a gun carriage, except during the Mexican War, scarcely a round of ammunition had for fifty years been prepared in the Confederate States." So for fifty years, the Confederate States had had no weaponry, had no manufacturing plants. He says, "No saltpeter was in store at any southern point. It was stored wholly at the north. There were no workable mines of lead except in Virginia, and the situation of those made them of precarious dependence. The only cannon foundry existing was at Richmond. Copper so necessary for field artillery and for percussion caps was just being obtained in East Tennessee. There was no rolling mill for bar iron south of Richmond, and but a few glass furnaces, and these with frightening exceptions were the border states of Virginia and Tennessee. The first efforts made to obtain powder were by order sent to the North, which had been early done by the Confederate government and some by the states. These were being rapidly filled when the attack was being made on Fort Sumter. Then the shipments ceased. Niter was contemporaneously sought for in North Alabama and Tennessee."

"Between four and five hundred tons of sulfur were obtained in New Orleans, at which place it had been imported for the use of the manufacture of sugar. Preparations for the construction of a large powder mill were promptly commenced by the government, and two small private mills in East Tennessee were supervised and improved. On June 1st, 1861, there was probably 250,000 pounds only, and about as much niter which had been imported by Georgia. There were the two powder mills above mentioned, but we had no experience in making powder or extracting niter from natural deposits or obtaining it in artificial beds." What is he saying? The South was ill-prepared to fight a war. Let me say this again. Let me put it to you plainly. The South was not only outmanned, it was outgunned. The weaponry was not in the South. Now do you see why I said earlier, we ought to ask the question, not why did the South lose the war, but why were they able to fight as long as they did? For four long years without sufficient food and weaponry.

Economic Advantage and Northern Plunder

The South had little gold, rampant inflation, and the North passed confiscation laws and stole cotton and property, enriching Northerners and devastating the Southern economy.

Many of you don't know, but Nathan Bedford Forrest, by the way, was a relatively wealthy man. And when he began his company, he sold a lot of his plants and animals and furnished his own unit with horses, weapons, and saddles, and whatever they needed. That's how many men got their weapons in the South, because they did not own them and were unable to purchase them, and they certainly were not in the South. So, the North had the numerical advantage, the North had an industrial advantage. Now let me get ready to shock you, because the North had an economic advantage. This ought to blow your mind. To me, I still cannot fathom this. But another great weakness in the South was an economic weakness. In 1861, the Confederate banks had a total of $26 million in gold. The citizens of the South probably had another $20 million in gold. So if the Confederacy had been able to get their hands on that additional 20 million, that would have only given them 46 million bucks in gold and that would have been extremely insufficient. Now listen to me. By the end of August 1861, let me just stop and refresh your mind, South Carolina seceded December 1861.

Fort Sumter was fired upon when the war began, April the 12th, 1861. So we're talking about August 1861. So from April to August, what is that? April, May, June, July, August, four months? Now listen, from April to August 1861, the pressing needs of the Confederacy led the government to the issuance of $135,000,000 in bonds and $311,000,000 in treasury notes. That's $446,000,000 from April to August. And the war lasted for four years.

So $46 million in gold would hardly be sufficient when you had $446 million in the first four months. Now, you've got to remember this, too, because a lot of this Confederate currency was unbacked. That meant inflation was rampant and prices rose out of sight. Now, one thing that North did to worsen the inflation is this. The North printed—let me say another word—the North counterfeited Confederate currency and spread it around to hasten inflation. But although that had some impact, it did not have much impact, and the reason why is most Southerners could spot the Northern counterfeit because it was such a higher quality than that of the South, because the South just did not have the machines to produce that kind of quality.

So, here's what—this is shocking, but now listen. I told you what it was from April to August. Now, listen to this. This is out of Ludwell Johnson's book, North vs. South. He says, "Until the last months of the conflict, military reverses had much less to do with inflation than shortages of goods and the velocity in the stock of money. Congress," that is the Confederate Congress, that Davis is urging, "curtailed the currency early in 1864 with some success."

"Prices were actually lower in November than they had been in March. Then the inflationary avalanche resumed, never again to be stopped. When all was over, the Confederate government had raised 5% of its income by taxation, 30% by borrowing, 60% by printing money, and 5% from miscellaneous sources." Now listen, "At the end of the war, its total obligations in confederate currency came to $712 million in funded debt and $1.554 billion in treasury notes." $1.554 billion.

So you might as well say that the war in four years cost the South two billion dollars. Needless to say, a lot of the average Southerner at the end of the war was out of poverty. You remember the series, the theme has been "Where We Are and How We Got Here." I want to show you where a lot of the confiscatory laws came from. This ought to infuriate you.

But anyhow, adding insult to injury, there were numerous confiscation and direct tax laws that were passed by the federal government, not the Confederate government, but the federal government, the United States government. What Congress wanted to do, and remember Congress was controlled by the Radical Republicans, Congress not only wanted to punish the South, but it wanted to make war profitable. And these laws also affected Northerners. What does that mean? You remember there were a group of people called Copperheads? Those Copperheads were Northerners who were absolutely sympathetic to the South. So this confiscation direct tax law confiscated, first of all, property from any Northern sympathizer. All the Northerners had to do was speak out in some manner some sympathy for the South, and their property even in the North was confiscated. Now, for some of you who are visiting today who did not get to hear this series, I just want you to know that Lincoln arrested without warrant and imprisoned nearly 40,000 Northerners without trial just simply because they disagreed with him. Now, the very fact that these confiscation and direct tax laws were unconstitutional did not stop Lincoln's Attorney General Edward Bates from confiscating nearly two million dollars worth of property from northerners who were sympathetic with the South while they were debating the constitutionality of these laws.

Now listen to this. During this time the federal government also passed a law—here it is—"for the collection of direct taxes in insurrectionary districts." Now, what does that mean? It means if you're fighting against the federal government, you are deemed in an insurrectionary district, and therefore they're going to directly tax you.

Now, I want to give you some quotes, and I want you to listen. Blow your mind, but listen. "Commissioners were appointed to follow in the track of Union armies." Did you hear that now? "Commissioners were appointed to follow in the track of Union armies, assessing real estate, setting the tax, and if it was not paid, taking the property and selling it at auction. That almost—OK, since everyone knew that many owners would be absent within Confederate lines, this amounted to confiscation. Those with inside information about the time and place of auctions could pick up valuable real estate for a small sum." "One Union general commented on the lack of competitive bidding and sales being monopolized by Northern sharpers, as a Connecticut private in South Carolina called them. New England capitalists acquired lands along the South Carolina coast under the law, and recently liberated blacks went to work for the new owners. Of course, tax sales were not the only way to wealth. Northern investors acquired much land, especially after the war, by purchasing mortgages and foreclosing on impoverished Southerners." Now, hold on.

"The proceeds from the confiscation and direct tax laws were small change compared to the bonanza of the Captured and Abandoned Property Act of March 3rd, 1863." Now listen, so Congress now passed another law and it is called the Captured or the Abandoned Property Act. "The latter's main concern was cotton, and its execution confirmed Southerners in their belief that the real object of the war was to rob them. Property of a non-warlike nature taken by Federal forces was regarded as captured. Property whose owners were absent, presumably within the Confederate lines, was considered abandoned." See, now let me give you an illustration. Let me just stop right here. I want you to equate this with a modern war on drugs. So here's a man riding down the road. He's got an ounce of marijuana in his car. Now, I'm not for marijuana. You know that. But what do they do? They not only arrest the man, they take the car.

Now, the car hasn't done anything wrong, but it's captured. You see? This is exactly what the Yankee soldiers did, what the federal government did to the South. So, of a non-warlike nature, it was captured. If the owner was not there, it was abandoned.

Now, listen, "The Treasury Department was responsible for its collection or administration. This led to a great proliferation of the Department's bureaucracy." All right, Treasury Department, here we go, "which was used by Secretary Chase as a political machine to promote his nomination for President in 1864. Wait a minute, the full extent of fraud perpetrated by these swarms of agents will never be known. In corrupt collusion with Army officers, they got up expeditions whose sole purpose was to capture cotton." "The Confederates sometimes made use of their opponents' lust for plunder to control the movements of federal troops. 'See that the Yankees get cotton now and then,' wrote General Leonidas Polk while commanding in Mississippi and Alabama, but then added, 'but not faster than for twofold purposes.'"

Now, listen to what he says. Now, this doesn't include unreported. "Reported gross sales of captured property came to $30 million, over nine-tenths from cotton, but one eyewitness estimated that not a tenth of the proceeds ever reached the Treasury. A conservative estimate is that $100 million in cotton was seized under the color of 1863 law, a sum equal to 40% of the value of the 1860 crop. The value of cotton stolen outright is not known." Now listen, "Abandoned property frequently consisted of entire plantations. These were leased to enterprising northerners who paid ex-slaves low wages to raise cotton." "Union army officers often cooperated with the leaseholder by compelling, forcing the local blacks to sell the plantation, and there must have been times when the latter were hard-put to distinguish between slavery and freedom." I should say so. "Some Northerners," hang on, "Some Northerners were impatient of all this legal chicanery. They demanded that the land of rebels be unceremoniously seized and given to Union veterans. Furthermore, if land were substituted for soldiers' pensions, the national debt would be smaller, a subject much discussed in Congress."

Now listen, "Organized expeditions of soldier-settlers ran the argument and sent them south to take what was due them. Eli Thayer of the Immigrant Aid Company suggested Florida as a target." I usually ask people, what is the southernmost northern state? Everybody, what up there, Maryland? No, Florida. And do you realize there are very few native Floridians down there now? I'm serious. Most of them are northern. So here we see, he says, we want you to take Florida. Now listen, this gets worse.

"The House Military Affairs Committee recommended that Lincoln be authorized to accept 30,000 volunteers for that purpose. Edward Atkinson tirelessly promoted the textile industry, preferred the fertile fields of cotton in Texas. Send their—" now listen to what he says—"send their enlightened New Englanders, their enlightened New England warriors, he said, to pluck these lands from their rebel owners, reconstruct Southern society, and raise cotton for the mills of their whole section." "There would be no labor problem." I'm quoting him now. "The ex-slave would have no choice but to work for the new proprietors. The only choice, as Atkinson bluntly said, would be labor or starvation. If he refused to work, let the Negro starve in exterminating—" I think he said, "—if he will. And so it will remove the Negro question. Still, we must raise cotton."

Really concerned about the poor blacks, weren't they? Really concerned. Do you realize military expeditions were sent into Florida and to Texas for this purpose? But they largely failed for military reasons.

Now, the Union Navy was in a better position to acquire goods, because the Union Navy had mobility and they also had the cargo space. Under the prize law that existed then, one half of all captured enemy property belonged to naval personnel. And then it was distributed to them according to their rank. Now, wait a minute. What about the drug money that's seized today? The local sheriff's department, or whoever seizes it, usually gets a percentage of it. Same thing.

Now, this was the prize clause. I want you to listen to this. By the way, some Southerners, to avoid the risk of losing absolutely everything, thank you, would oftentimes go to the federal naval officers and arrange to be captured if they could get back a percentage of their own goods from the Navy, since the Navy got half of it anyhow, because they knew more than likely they were going to be captured anyway. One Navy Admiral, one Yankee Admiral, who was so good at this, was Admiral David Dixon Porter. He was so good that the Confederates gave him the nom de guerre, the name of war, as "Thief of the Mississippi." That's what he was known as, the Thief of the Mississippi. His reputation for stealing was such that his own mother wrote him and asked him, quote, "if his cabin was really full of silver taken from plantations as she had heard." Now let me tell you, I'm going to mention this a little bit next week. I'm not going to get into it right now. But a lot of the federal officers were known rapists, thieves, and murderers.

Now, David Dixon Porter would be a Sunday school child if you compared him to Benjamin Butler. General Butler hanged a young Southern boy in Louisiana. He was the military governor over Louisiana. He hanged the young Southern boy only because the Southern boy climbed to the top of the building and took down the Yankee flag. And he hanged him for it. Benjamin Butler had two nicknames. One of them was "Beast Butler," because he was so wicked and murdered so many people. I mean, there aren't—

But he had another nickname, and that other nickname was "Spoons," because wherever he went, he stole. And he would even steal the silverware in the houses of the—them. So he was named Beast Butler and Spoons Butler. Now, David Dixon Porter was the thief of the Mississippi. Porter's sailors sometimes stole cotton and then they would stencil on it "CSA" to make it look like it was captured just so they could have their share. Now listen, Porter was so good at this, his share, his share, his share for one operation was $60,000. We're talking about the 1860s now, folks. We're talking about when dollars were usually backed with gold.

Now, let me tell you something. I hope you can see, not only the numerical and the industrial advantage, or the economic advantage, not only was the South using everything they could to support their southern soldiers, but when the North came by, they were stealing and taking everything that they could possibly take. No wonder the South was reduced to absolutely nothing. Let me tell you folks, the South did not have a government in place.

Preview of Theological Answer

Weaver states that next week he will provide the theological answer, showing that both North and South lost in God's providence.

It did not have the manpower. It did not have the industry. It did not have the economics. So the question could be asked, not just why the South lost, but how was the South enabled to fight as long? I read just the other day, someone said, "God's triumphs are often disguised as a string of disasters." And I think next week, when we get to the theological answer, and we're going to look in the scripture, we'll see it was not just the South that lost. It was not just the South that lost. I'm going to show you the North lost as well. Let's pray.


Study Guide

Major Themes

Sovereignty of God in History

Summary: God ordains all events in history, and no event occurs apart from His eternal decree.

Evidence: Weaver says, 'nothing comes to pass in time in history except that which God has ordained in eternity past.'

Divine Purpose in Defeat

Summary: God's people may be handed over to enemies even when not in open sin, for His own purposes.

Evidence: Psalm 44:17-22 is cited to show that defeat can come 'for thy sake.'

Human Inadequacy vs. Divine Provision

Summary: Victory comes from God, not from human strength or weaponry.

Evidence: Psalm 44:3,6 are quoted: 'they got not the land in possession by their own sword... I will not trust in my bow.'

Northern Aggression and Tyranny

Summary: The North, under Lincoln, initiated a war of aggression and imposed tyrannical measures.

Evidence: Weaver refers to 'Abraham Lincoln's reign and the tyranny that began there' and mentions arrests without warrant.

Economic Exploitation of the South

Summary: The North systematically plundered Southern resources through confiscation laws and military theft.

Evidence: Quotes from Ludwell Johnson describe the Captured and Abandoned Property Act and theft of cotton.

Key Arguments

The South's loss cannot be explained solely by human factors

Summary: Economic, political, and military explanations are partial; the theological dimension is essential.

Evidence: Weaver states, 'when you leave out the theological answer, I believe you've left out the majority of the answer.'

The North had overwhelming numerical superiority

Summary: The North could field four to five times as many men, making Southern resistance remarkable.

Evidence: Census figures and battle statistics are cited, including Chancellorsville where 45,000 Confederates faced 125,000 Federals.

The South was industrially unprepared for war

Summary: The South lacked factories, machinery, and raw materials, and had almost no armaments at the start.

Evidence: Jefferson Davis's account is quoted: 'Not an arm, not a gun, not a gun carriage... had for fifty years been prepared in the Confederate States.'

The South faced insurmountable economic disadvantages

Summary: The Confederacy had little gold, printed massive unbacked currency, and suffered from Northern confiscation and theft.

Evidence: Statistics on gold reserves, bond issuance, and the Captured and Abandoned Property Act are provided.

The real question is how the South endured so long

Summary: Given the disparities, the South's four-year resistance was miraculous.

Evidence: Weaver says, 'it's only by an absolute miracle that the South was able to last four long years under such adverse circumstances.'

Scripture References

Psalm 44:1-26

Context: Read in full to illustrate that God's people can be defeated even when faithful, as a framework for the South's loss.

Psalm 44:3

Context: Cited to show that victory is ascribed to God, not human weapons.

Psalm 44:6

Context: Quoted to emphasize trust in God rather than weaponry.

Psalm 44:17-22

Context: Used to argue that defeat may come 'for thy sake' rather than because of sin.

Romans 8:36

Context: Mentioned as the New Testament quotation of Psalm 44:22, in the context of victory despite oppression.

Historical References

First Battle of Bull Run / First Manassas (July 21, 1861)

Context: Described as a Confederate victory that could have ended the war if Stonewall Jackson's advice to march on Washington had been followed.

Battle of Chancellorsville

Context: Cited as an example of Southern numerical disadvantage: 45,000 Confederates defeated 125,000 Federals.

Confederate armaments at the start of the war

Context: Jefferson Davis's account details the severe shortage of weapons, ammunition, and manufacturing capability.

Captured and Abandoned Property Act (March 3, 1863)

Context: Federal law used to seize Southern cotton and property, enriching Northern agents and the Treasury.

Admiral David Dixon Porter

Context: Union naval officer known as 'Thief of the Mississippi' for extensive theft of Southern property.

General Benjamin Butler

Context: Union general nicknamed 'Beast Butler' and 'Spoons' for his brutality and theft in Louisiana.

Important Quotes

nothing comes to pass in time in history except that which God has ordained in eternity past.

Significance: Establishes the theological foundation that all historical events are under God's sovereign control.

it's only by an absolute miracle that the South was able to last four long years under such adverse circumstances.

Significance: Highlights the central argument that human factors alone cannot explain the South's endurance.

Not an arm, not a gun, not a gun carriage, except during the Mexican War, scarcely a round of ammunition had for fifty years been prepared in the Confederate States.

Significance: Jefferson Davis's testimony to the South's complete lack of industrial preparation for war.

when you leave out the theological answer, I believe you've left out the majority of the answer as well.

Significance: Argues for the primacy of divine providence in understanding historical outcomes.

God's triumphs are often disguised as a string of disasters.

Significance: Foreshadows the theological interpretation that apparent defeat may serve God's purposes.

Discussion Questions

How does Psalm 44 challenge the assumption that faithfulness always leads to visible victory?

Context: Weaver uses Psalm 44 to show that God's people can suffer defeat even when not in open rebellion.

In what ways does recognizing God's sovereignty over history change how we interpret national tragedies?

Context: Weaver emphasizes that all history is 'God's history' and ordained from eternity.

Why does Weaver argue that the real question is not why the South lost, but how it held out so long?

Context: He lists overwhelming Northern advantages in manpower, industry, and economics.

What role did economic exploitation play in the North's victory, and how does this reflect on the morality of the war?

Context: Weaver details confiscation laws and theft of cotton and property by Union forces.

Applications

Trust in God, not in human resources

Summary: Believers should depend on God for protection and victory, not on physical weaponry or human strength.

Evidence: Weaver says, 'It's wrong to put your trust in your weaponry. That doesn't mean you not to have any, but you don't trust it.'

Recognize God's hand in national judgment

Summary: Current societal problems may be consequences of past national sins, requiring repentance and return to God's Word.

Evidence: Weaver prays, 'we're suffering today from the sins of our fathers... as they have sown the wind, we're reaping the whirlwind.'

deepseek | deepseek-v4-pro | clean_readable_transcript | 2026-06-05T14:14:26Z

deepseek | deepseek-v4-pro | weaver_study | 2026-06-06T02:24:19Z